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 Purvis 1 
Introduction 
In late September 1992, the District Court of Leipzig in eastern Germany handed down 
an indictment of former East German judge Otto Fuchs. Shortly thereafter, Judge Fuchs and his 
wife jumped out of a seventh story window. Fuchs was found in the morning, clutching his 
wife’s hand as they lay, lifeless, on the cobblestone street below.1 This tragic act marked the end 
of Fuchs’ story, and the beginning of another, for Fuchs was not the only one subpoenaed by the 
Leipzig District Court that day. The court charged eighty-six-year-old Otto Jürgens with the 
same crime, and unlike his colleague, who jumped to his death to avoid being brought to justice, 
Jürgens decided to face his fate head-on.  
These two men, only one of which lived to see his day in court, were being charged for 
their roles in orchestrating one of the most notorious show trials in East German history: the 
Waldheim Trials. The Waldheim Trials took place in a small courtroom at the East German 
Waldheim Penitentiary in 1950, only seven months after the East German state was founded. 
These trials, which were orchestrated by the East German, communist government, targeted 
former Nazis as part of a broader “denazification” campaign designed to demonize fascism in the 
wake of Hitler’s fall. 2 The Waldheim Trials were political show trials that were designed to 
demonstrate the new state’s power and dominance over its Nazi predecessors.3 As such, they 
represented one of East Germany’s first attempts to address Nazi crimes in a legal setting.4 
Forty-two years later, during the process of German reunification, Otto Jürgens, the only living 
                                                
1 “Waldheim-Richter: Ich war nicht SED-gelenkt,” Neues Deutschland, November 19, 1992. 
2 Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 50.  
3 Quint, The Imperfect Union, 50.  
4 Ulrich Merten, The Gulag in East Germany: Soviet Special Camps 1945-1950 (New York: 
Teneo Press, 2018), 140. 
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Waldheim judge, was put on trial in the East German town of Leipzig as part of the political 
establishment of the new, democratic, unified German state. This thesis tells the story of that 
later trial, described here as the 1992 Leipzig trial, and its significance within the context of post-
war and post-unification German national development.  
This thesis follows the narrative of the 1992 Leipzig trial, which represented the unified 
German government’s condemnation of the East German judicial system and its legal practices 
in an effort to bolster its own.  Like the East and West German judicial trials that preceded it, the 
1992 Leipzig trial was designed to carry out the political agenda of the government which 
instituted it. In the case of unified Germany in the early 1990s, the government’s primary goal 
was to drive the state-building process forward.5  
This thesis argues that the 1992 Leipzig trial functioned as part of the broader political 
process of state-building in unified Germany. This trial was designed as a critique of the East 
German state and its legal system, which aided in the establishment of the new, democratic, 
unified German nation. The trial also served as an expression of the new political and legal 
norms in unified Germany, which, after the fall of East Germany, were derivatives of the values 
that governed West Germany and its legal system. By condemning the legal values of the 
previous regime and endorsing those of the new liberal government, the trial functioned as a 
political catalyst for the unified German state-building process, at the heart of which was the 
expression of new standards of justice structured around due process, impartial sentencing and 
evidence accumulation. The 1992 trial also became a point of political contention in the midst of 
the German unification period. The responses were divided along political lines with a portion of 
the responses originating in former East German communities and the rest in former West 
                                                
5 Quint, The Imperfect Union.  
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German communities. Despite this division, both responses to the trial illustrate its purpose as a 
pedagogical vehicle for the proliferation of new legal standards and norms in unified Germany.  
As products of the unification process, which involved the merging of two distinct states 
and legal systems, the political complexities surrounding the 1992 Leipzig trial, and the 
unification process in general, had their origins in the political environments of East and West 
Germany.   
After the fall of the Third Reich, the German empire was divided into two politically 
distinct states, each with their own interpretation of and approach to addressing the crimes of 
their shared past. The East German state was founded in 1949 as a Soviet-occupied, communist 
state, while West Germany was established the same year as a democratic state governed by the 
Allied nations. In the wake of the Holocaust, these two emerging nations were faced with the 
challenge of reintegrating into an international community that defined them by their atrocious 
actions during the Second World War.6 After the German defeat, the occupying Soviet and 
Allied powers expected a reckoning for the crimes of the Holocaust before they would support 
the new Germanies, both politically and financially.7  This recognition of the crimes of the Nazi 
era and public rejection of its fascist ideology became an essential way for the two states to 
distinguish themselves from their political predecessor.8  In order to project this departure from 
Nazism, the East and West German states engaged in “denazification” efforts designed to sever 
their ties with the previous regime.  
Despite this shared goal, the two state’s approaches to these denazification campaigns 
varied widely from one another. The denazification campaigns of communist East Germany 
                                                
6 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1997), 3. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
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were informed by its totalitarian political structure and involved the proliferation of verbal and 
visual propaganda, mass arrests, and the political cleansing of former Nazis and enemies of the 
state.9 The West German denazification efforts were informed by the state’s democratic values 
and entailed a more measured approach to targeting former Nazis. This involved the removal of 
any Nazi officials from power and the public prosecution of former Nazi criminals, especially 
those who participated in the Holocaust.10 As part of these denazification efforts, both East and 
West Germany made use of their legal systems as vehicles for denazification as well as tools to 
express their respective legal and political values. Decades later, the 1992 Leipzig trial became a 
product of these contested judicial legacies. 
In East Germany, the 1950 Waldheim Trials represented one of the clearest examples of 
this state’s judicial approach to denazification. These trials consisted of a series of very short 
hearings during which 3,400 former Nazis and enemies of the Soviet state were “tried” before a 
panel of East German Soviet judges.11 As the presiding judges, Otto Fuchs and Otto Jürgens 
sentenced all 3,400 of these individuals in a series of 10-minute-long hearings, conducted on the 
basis of hearsay and political denunciations. No evidence was presented over the course of the 
proceedings.12 The majority of the defendants were convicted and 32 were sentenced to death by 
hanging or firing squad.13 These proceedings speak to the performative and political nature of the 
trials, which, although typical of many totalitarian regimes, was the aspect of the trials which the 
orchestrators of the 1992 Leipzig Trial of the Waldheim judges criticized most openly.  
                                                
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany (Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2011), 266.  
11 Dr. Falco Werkentin, “Waldheimer-Prozesse,” Lexicon der Politischen Strafprozesse, July 2018. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.   
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Like East Germany, the West Germans held trials of former Nazis in an attempt to 
criminalize the actions of the Nazi regime and bolster their own legal values. For example, the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, which was conducted in West Germany in 1963, charged 22 former 
high and low-level Nazi personnel for their role in orchestrating the Holocaust and managing the 
Auschwitz work and death camps.14 This trial was conducted over two years and involved the 
accumulation of evidence and the presentation of cases in favor of and against the accused. The 
Auschwitz trials followed in the footsteps of other Holocaust trials carried out by western 
powers, such as the Nuremberg and the Eichmann Trials. These trials, which targeted high-level 
Nazi officials and organizers of the Holocaust, were a manifestation of the Allied states’ 
democratic legal values in that they prioritized the accumulation and presentation of evidence, a 
practice that varied widely from the East German legal practices of the time.15 Similarly, the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial was a product of the West German states’ democratic commitment to 
due process and the establishment of an evidentiary record in the context of their legal 
denazification efforts.16 This thesis shows that, like the trials of East and West Germany, the 
unified German judicial trials, including the one which occurred in Leipzig in 1992, were direct 
products of their political environment.  
While trials are not the only way that countries have grappled with historical crimes, this 
arena is particularly interesting because it functions as a site for the assertion of new legal 
norms.17 This expression of new standards of justice is especially essential in the context of 
transitional political periods. After the fall of the Nazis, the East German state used its legal 
                                                
14 Rebecca Wittmann, Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
15 Herf, Divided Memory, 3. 
16 Wittmann, Beyond Justice. 
17 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 29.  
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system to communicate its values of political allegiance and dedication to the Soviet state.18 In 
West Germany, the state used trials as a means of asserting new standards of justice structured 
around the liberal legal values of due process and judicial impartiality.19 After German 
unification, as this thesis argues, the new government used the 1992 Leipzig trial as a vehicle for 
the expression of new, western-oriented legal norms. In this sense, the 1992 Leipzig trial is part 
of a long tradition of German trials orchestrated with specific political purposes in mind, the 
most notable of which is the pedagogical communication of new legal and political values.  
Additionally, this form of historical redress allows for the crimes committed to be 
officially documented as part of the historical record, which legitimizes and memorializes the 
experiences of the victims and chronicles the development of the nation’s legal practices. This 
function is especially necessary during periods of transition when states are concerned with the 
establishment of new political and legal practices and values.20 Therefore, the theoretical 
approach explored in this thesis uses the 1992 Leipzig trial as a lens through which to understand 
the social, legal, and political developments which took place during German unification. 
 While there have been historical works that address trials during the unification period, 
the 1992 Leipzig trial, which is at the heart of this thesis, remains unexplored.  In general, there 
are three categories of works that have informed my research: general works on historical trials 
and their role as elements of the state-building process, works that discuss East and West 
German trials, and writings on the state-building process and transitional justice in reunified 
Germany.  
                                                
18 Herf, Divided Memory.  
19 Wittmann, Beyond Justice.  
20 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso, 1991); Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
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When it comes to more general discussions of historical trials, the works of Lawrence 
Douglas, Charles Lansing, Christoph Burchard, David Cohen, Yuma Totani, Hannah Arendt, and 
Renee Romano have all deepened my understanding of trials as vehicles for historical analysis. 
With a specific focus on transitional justice trials such as the Nuremberg Trials, the Tokyo 
Trials, and the Eichmann Trials, as well as the reopening of Civil Rights era cold cases, these 
authors use historical trials as windows into the political and legal environments of different 
historical periods. 21 Through the use of trial transcripts, periodicals, and personal accounts, these 
works emphasize how certain trials highlighted the political, racial, religious, and social tensions 
which defined their respective historical periods.22 Although these works do not focus 
specifically on the German unification period, their analyses of historical trials as arenas for 
socio-political discussions serve as inspiration for the structure and development of my 
argument.  
As a branch of this general legal analysis, a section of my source base grapples with the 
role that the law plays in the construction of new states. These works, which include monographs 
by Jeffrey Herf and Mary Fulbrook, identify the legal arena as a site for the expression of new 
ideologies in the midst of political transition.23 These authors examine the German post-war 
period and the development of the two states of East and West Germany through the lens of legal 
practices.24 These authors make the argument that the assertion of new legal and political norms 
                                                
21 Charles Lansing, From Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteachers Under Two Dictatorships (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).; Christoph Burchard, “The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany” 
(Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 4, Issue 4, 1 September 2006.); Renee Romano, Racial 
Reckoning: Prosecuting America's Civil Rights Murders, (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 2014); Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, N.Y: 
Viking Press, 1963); David Cohen and Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Law, History and 
Jurisprudence (Stanford University Press, 2019). 
22 Ibid.  
23 Herf, Divided Memory.; Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust.  
24 Ibid.  
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was an essential aspect of the state-building process in the post-war Germanies.25 Even though 
these works do not address unification era trials specifically, their discussion of the post-war 
state-building processes in East and West Germany serves as necessary background for my 
discussion.  
Building on this historiography, authors Rebecca Wittmann, Devin O. Pendas, Martha 
Minow, and Falco Werkentin have written works that speak directly to post-war trials in East and 
West Germany.26 These works discuss trials such as the West German Frankfurt Auschwitz 
Trials and the East German Waldheim Trials in great depth and provide analyses that speak to 
the importance of these trials as tools in the state-building process.27 As the political 
predecessors to the unified German trials, the trials of East and West Germany illuminate the 
important role that the law played in constructing a future for these two states. These trials, and 
the historical works that discuss them, form the basis of my analysis of the 1992 Leipzig trial and 
the unification period.  
As background for my analysis of unification era trials, I consulted historical works that 
address the unification period and the political complexities surrounding it. In particular, the 
works of James McAdams, Peter E. Quint, and Andrew Bickford include in-depth analyses of 
the unification period, the constitutional structures, and the legal changes which came with the 
merging of East and West Germany.28  While most of these analyses are separated from the 
                                                
25 Ibid.  
26 Wittmann, Beyond Justice.; Devin O. Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965: Genocide, History and 
the Limits of the Law (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Werkentin, “Waldheimer-Prozesse.”; 
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.   
27 Ibid.  
28 James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton University Press, 2001).; Quint, 
The Imperfect Union.; Andrew Bickford, Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post-Unification Germany (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). Quint, Imperfect Union.  
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study of historical trials, they provide necessary background on the unified German legal 
structure and judicial practices during the 1990s.29  
Finally, my analysis most closely relates to the existing literature which grapples with 
trials within the German unification period. The works of Peter E. Quint, Andrew Bickford, 
Martha Minow, Tina Rosenberg, and Monika Zorn all analyze unified German historical trials.30 
The works of Quint, Minow, and Rosenberg directly address trials such as the 1991 Border 
Guard Trials, which involved the prosecution of East German border wall guards who shot 
defectors as they attempted to flee.31 However, their focus is not on the specific trial which I 
intend to analyze. Along with trial transcripts, these sources all make use of press articles and 
first-hand testimony, which are essential sources for my analysis.32 In that sense, these works 
have both informed my understanding of unified German judicial trends and set an example for 
how I should be addressing them.  
 Like many of my historiographical predecessors, my work is primarily a legal history in 
that it examines a period of political transition through the lens of a judicial trial. This work also 
contains elements of social history. These elements are especially apparent in my third chapter 
which examines the German public responses to the 1992 Leipzig trial.  
Unlike those legal historians who have preceded me, my work does not rely heavily on 
trial transcripts because I could not get access to the Leipzig Court Archives which house the 
transcripts as the result of the German data protection act. This act makes it especially difficult 
for amateur academics to access information on individuals who may still be living, and since the 
                                                
29 Ibid.; Monika Zorn, Hitlers zweimal getötete Opfer: Westdeutsche Endlösung des Antifaschismus auf dem Gebiet 
der DDR (Berlin:Ahriman-Verlag GmbH, 1994).  
30 Ibid.; Tina Rosenburg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism (NewYork:Vintage,1995); 
Bickford, Fallen Elites.; Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.  
31 Rosenburg, The Haunted Land, 343.  
32 Ibid.  
 Purvis 10 
trial was so recent, this act was a barrier to my research. In place of trial transcripts, I have turned 
to personal interviews and newspaper articles from the time.  
Throughout the thesis, I draw on interviews, which I conducted during my trip to 
Germany in January 2020, and newspaper articles from the period to contextualize and to 
substantiate my claims regarding the 1992 Leipzig trial. During my time in Germany, I was able 
to conduct five interviews with a variety of subjects who experienced the unification process, the 
1992 Leipzig trial, and the public reactions to both. While these personal accounts helped to 
deepen my understanding of the trial proceedings and the surrounding political environment, 
they cannot necessarily be taken at face value. Since these accounts are opinions, it is important 
to consider the possibility of personal biases. However, these personal biases are interesting in 
and of themselves. These testimonies speak, in part, to the public reactions to these trials and the 
unification process on a smaller scale. Therefore, most of these sources have been incorporated 
into sections of the thesis that discuss public opinion.  
Additionally, one of my interviews functioned as a useful source for the events of the 
trials, in light of a missing trial transcript. My interview with a Tageszeitung journalist who was 
an eyewitness of the trial, proved invaluable in the development of my argument. The journalist,  
who was one of the few journalists who covered the 1992 Leipzig trial and met defendant Otto 
Jürgens and prosecutor Deitrich Bauer was an essential source both in my retelling of the events 
of the trial and in my analysis of the political significance of the trial. The journalist provided me 
with the intimate details of the trial proceedings, the reactions of the defendant and prosecutor, as 
well as inside details regarding the public and press’s response to the trials. This information was 
especially valuable for my second and third chapters.  
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Along with my interviews, this work relies heavily on newspaper and law journal articles 
published at the time of the trials. Articles from formerly West German papers Der Spiegel, Der 
Tageszeitung, and The Nürnberger Nachrichten provided essential details that illuminate the 
events of the trial, as well as information regarding the western reception of the trials. In order to 
craft a comprehensive understanding of this perspective, I analyzed every article that discussed 
the 1992 proceedings published by these outlets in the years during, directly before, and after the 
trial.  
In order to bolster my analysis of the former East German community’s response to the 
trials, I relied on the formerly East German newspaper Neues Deutschland and analyzed every 
article published on the trial between the years of 1990 and 1994. I also made use of international 
tribunals such as Reuters News, the Wall Street Journal, and The Associated Press to 
contextualize these local responses and illuminate the ways in which the international 
community regarded the trial and its purpose.  
 Aside from local and international periodicals, I also incorporate analyses of western-
oriented unified German law journals that address the trials and express specific opinions. 
Journals such as Juristen Zeitung and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift published articles covering 
the trial and analyzing its purpose in great depth. The western perspective that these articles offer 
is especially useful in the context of my analysis of the trial reception and the political divide 
which defined it.  
As is the case with many works of historical research, this thesis is subject to a series of 
limitations. The limited time frame in which I conducted my research contributed significantly to 
my source-base and the scope of my topic. Due to the inaccessible nature of the 1992 Leipzig 
trial transcript, my research rests heavily on newspaper articles and eyewitness testimony, which 
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are inherently subject to bias. As a result, this work functions more as an analysis of the press’ 
responses and select public reactions to the unification process and the trials than an in-depth 
discussion of the proceedings themselves. Additionally, because I was only able to spend a short 
amount of time in Berlin conducting interviews and archival research, a lot of my analysis 
depends on state records, journal articles, and press reports, which inherently express more of the 
state’s intentions and sentiments than those of the German public. However, I made use of a few 
select interviews and press articles to try and make the public voice more apparent.  
Through an analysis of the 1992 Leipzig trial, this thesis delves into the politically 
complex history of German unification and emphasizes how the unified German state used its 
legal system, and the 1992 Leipzig trial, as a means of establishing new legal norms and calling 
the East German state to account for its judicial wrongdoings. As a state desperate to establish its 
own political and legal identity, distinct from that of the East German regime, the unified 
German government depended on the 1992 Leipzig trial to fulfill its political purpose and aid in 
the establishment of new legal norms grounded in liberal judicial values.   
This thesis is divided into three chapters and proceeding chronologically. My first chapter 
discusses the unification period and the legal and political developments which paved the way 
for the 1992 Leipzig trial. The second chapter discusses the trial itself and the elements of the 
proceedings that were impacted by the political environment of unification. The third chapter, 
which takes place after the conclusion of the 1992 Leipzig trial, examines the public responses to 
the trial and the political divide which defined them. My conclusion highlights the significance 
of the Leipzig trial in aiding the unified German state-building process and illuminates the 
enduring importance of the trial’s legal legacy in modern-day Germany.  
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Chapter 1 
A New Germany: Trials and the State Building Process in Unified Germany 
Years after its symbolic, and in places literal destruction, the Berlin Wall still stands tall 
in the outer regions of Berlin. The wall was maintained in certain districts of unified Berlin, such 
as the outskirts of Prinzlauerberg, in an effort to remember the nation’s divided history.33 These 
sections of the wall are now adorned with photographs and placards memorializing the 
unification event. The memorialized version of the wall tells a story of unity at a site of division. 
While some pieces of the wall stand tall in the heart of the bustling city, other wall memorials are 
located on the outskirts of Berlin, where the atmosphere is bleak. Upon visiting one of these 
more removed wall memorials in Prinzlauerberg, I noticed a difference in the industrial 
landscape on one side of the wall compared to the other. One side appeared to have been 
developed significantly, while the other remained barren and grey. “That is old East Berlin,” 
noted my companion, a former West German lawyer, “pretty sad, isn’t it?”34  
 “You know, it was an occupation, not a peaceful unification.”35 This statement, 
expressed by one of my interviewees, highlights some of the politically hostile elements of the 
unification process.36 As historian Andrew Bickford noted in his work Fallen Elites: The 
Military Other in Post-Unification Germany, “West German elites felt that they could do as they 
pleased” during unification. After all, the East German state had collapsed and they had won.37 
According to Bickford, this triumphalist attitude on the part of West Germans represented a 
                                                
33 Matt Kelley, “Gone but not Forgotten: Why the Berlin Wall Maintains a Grip on Us,” UVA Today, University of 
Virginia, February 8, 2018.  
34 Anonymous, interviewed by author, Berlin, January 7, 2020. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Bickford, Fallen Elites,10.  
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“general trend in the early years of unification, when large numbers of GDR officials, 
bureaucrats, teachers, professors, and anyone whose loyalty to the new German state was seen as 
questionable, lost their jobs… and were replaced with West Germans or East Germans who were 
considered politically reliable.” 38 In legal terms, Bickford describes the notion of “disqualifying 
justice,” as a form of punishment employed “even if [the East Germans] could not be held 
directly responsible for abuses or illegal actions in the GDR.”39 Even though these punitive 
measures were indirect, Bickford asserts their importance as the political and legal context for 
the trials that followed-- including the 1992 Leipzig trial.   
As this chapter will discuss, this political cleansing process was an essential aspect of the 
German unification and state-building processes as it sought to establish a new German national 
identity in the wake of division. This chapter will show how the West German legal and political 
systems dominated the unification process in a way that condemned and excluded the East 
German judiciary. Ironically, however, this attempt to unify the nation under one political 
ideology and extend the western constitution and legal jurisdiction created even more political 
resentment and division within the new state.   
At its core, German unification was a politically partisan state-building process that 
depended on the condemnation of one political ideology, namely East German communism, and 
the proliferation of another, namely West German liberalism. This process, and all of the 
complications associated with it, ultimately laid the political and legal groundwork for the 1992 
Leipzig trial. Politically, the unification process involved the West German condemnation of 
East German ideologies, which became a driving motivation for the trial.  
                                                
38 Bickford, Fallen Elites,11.  
39 Ibid.  
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This chapter aims to place the 1992 Leipzig trial within the context of the relevant 
political and legal controversies that arose during the German unification process. Through the 
use of first-hand accounts of witnesses and German press reports, this chapter highlights the 
politically divisive elements of German unification and the subsequent legal changes. It will 
focus on the legal dynamics of the transition to a Western-dominated governmental system and 
explore debates about the constitutional amendments that accompanied this process. Finally, the 
chapter will discuss the trails of the Berlin Wall Border Guards, which served as important 
precedents to the 1992 trial.   
 
Political Unification  
 In the summer of 1989, months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the politically turbulent 
nature of the looming merger was already apparent. Those both against and in favor of 
unification took to the streets in protests and demonstrations that spanned the nation.40 As 
Andrew Curry, a reporter for the West German newspaper Der Spiegel reported, those against 
the merger were quickly drowned out by the significant demand for unification which came from 
protestors in both East and West Germany.41 “We all went out to protest, we wanted to be part of 
the West and we knew we had to fight for it,” recalls aformer East German citizen and political 
activist.42 Despite the variety of smaller protests across the country, the epicenter of the pro-
unification movement was the East German town of Leipzig, the future location of the 1992 trial.  
 From the beginning, the town of Leipzig played a significant role in the unification 
process. Between September 1989 and April 1991, Leipzig became the site of the largest and 
                                                
40 Hans Hoffmeister, Mirko Hemple, eds, Die Wende in Thüringen: Ein Rückblick (2nd ed.), Arnstadt / Weimar: 
Thüringische Landeszeitung / Rhino Verlag, 2000, 3.  
41 Andrew Curry, “A Peaceful Revolution in Leipzig,” Der Spiegel, October 9, 2009.  
42 Anonymous,  interviewed by author, January 10, 2020.  
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longest pro-unification demonstration in Germany. Every Monday during this period, a group of 
dissatisfied East German citizens assembled in public spaces in Leipzig, eventually filling Karl 
Marx Platz (Karl Marx Square) and spilling over into the courtyards of St. Nicholas Church, to 
demand rights such as the freedom to travel to foreign countries and to elect a democratic 
government.43 These individuals called for the basic freedoms which the citizens in West 
Germany enjoyed.  Known as the “Leipzig Demonstrations” or the “Monday Demonstrations,” 
given that they took place every week on a Monday, the protests were broadcast within Germany 
and to countries across the world, with the New York Times referring to them as “the largest 
[German] rally in decades.”44  
West German press coverage of the protests prompted copy-cat demonstrations across 
West Germany. As unification historians Hans Hoffmeister and Mirko Hemple explain, 
individuals gathered in city squares and parks to demonstrate support for the Leipzigers and to 
express solidarity.45 The Monday Demonstrations, which began in the church courtyards and 
public parks in Leipzig, served as an initial catalyst for the unification of East and West 
Germany.46 
These protests were at the heart of the unification movement, and it was not long until 
their demands were met. On November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the collapse of 
the East German state and the reunification of East and West. The individuals who spearheaded 
the campaign for reunification included intellectuals, layman citizens, religious priests who had 
                                                
43 Hoffmeister and Hemple, Die Wende in Thüringen, 3.  
44 Serge Schmemann, “100,000 Protest in Leipzig In Largest Rally in Decades,” The New York Times, October 17, 
1989.   
45 Hoffmeister and Hemple, Die Wende in Thüringen, 3. 
46 Peter Critschley, “Did a prayer meeting really bring down the Berlin Wall and end the Cold War?”, BBC, October 
9, 2015.  
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been participating in underground GDR opposition movements, those attempting to flee East 
Germany, and those disillusioned with the GDR’s political ideology and their repressive 
governing tactics.47 These individuals, many of whom had participated in the Monday 
Demonstrations in Leipzig, were considered the drivers of the “Peaceful Revolution” 
(“Friedliche Revolution”).48 Later, they, along with the governmental figures who supported 
their cause, would come to be known as GDR reformers. The protests helped to establish 
Leipzig’s reputation as a city in favor of unification and against the oppressive power of the East 
German state. In many ways, the 1992 Leipzig trial, which occurred less than a year after the 
Monday demonstrations, was an extension of this political agenda.  
 
Legal Unification and Constitutional Amendment  
As was the case with the fall of the Nazi state, the collapse of communism and the East 
German nation marked a point of victory for liberal democratic ideology. The subsequent power 
imbalance between Eastern and Western ideologies went on to shape the course of unification 
and the legal and political integration of the two states. As one of my interviewees put it, “the 
West was absorbing the East, it wasn’t like they were meeting in the middle.”49 This 
interviewee’s West German perspective in this instance is significant. The power imbalance 
present during unification was so obvious that both West and East Germans recognized it. 
Although this political impartiality didn’t come as a shock to most German citizens, this aspect 
of the political environment during unification serves as the foundation for my analysis of the 
trials which it produced.  
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Many historical works on unification make note of this political imbalance. Andrew 
Bickford, for example, focuses his analysis of the unification period on the impact that West 
German political bias had on East German elites and state officials.50 As Bickford demonstrates, 
East German elites were barred from participation in the new state based on their previous 
political affiliations with the East German state.51 According to Bickford, this form of 
punishment was not necessarily based on “what they did,” and their actions as members of the 
Soviet state. 52 Instead, “they were punished for…who they were in the past, regardless of 
wrongdoing, and because they ‘should have known better’ than to have served in what to West 
Germans was…a ‘state without the rule of law (Unrechsstaat).’” By purposefully disqualifying 
former East German officials from positions in the new unified government based on their 
political allegiances, conspicuous political biases against the GDR’s ruling elite persisted 
throughout the unification process.53 
Despite this power imbalance, the former East and West German governments were not 
entirely at odds when it came to their shared goal of merging the two states.54 In their discussion 
of the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, historians Hoffmeister and Hemple emphasize that 
both East and West Germans participated in the demonstrations, thereby alluding to the notion 
that citizens on both sides of the wall supported the proposal for unification.55 This public 
cooperation was also present at the state level during the unification negotiations.  
One of the more prominent dilemmas guiding these negotiations, and the issue most 
relevant to this discussion, was the establishment of a unified German legal system and the 
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potential drafting of a new constitution. At the heart of this discussion was the question of 
whether the unified German state should be governed by a new set of laws which required 
constitutional amendment on both sides of the east/west border, or if the unified German state 
would be governed by the same constitution, or “Basic Law,” that existed in West Germany 
before reunification.56 The former option, which involved the proposal of a “German 
Confederation” in place of a unified German state, would allow the East German state to 
maintain a degree of governmental and legal integrity, which made it a popular choice among 
those East German citizens who were opposed to unification.57 The latter possibility would 
involve the complete popular and constitutional absorption of East Germany into West 
Germany.58 As historian Peter Quint articulated in his analysis of the unification process and its 
political complexities, this latter choice meant that unified Germany would not be considered, in 
the eyes of the international community, to be a new state distinct from its East and West 
German predecessors.59  
East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
discussed this concept of a German Confederation at a roundtable in West Berlin, and according 
to a report published by German historian Volkmar Schoenenburg, both expressed initial 
enthusiasm about the idea.60 However, when the possibility of complete constitutional and 
geographic unification was proposed, this initial proposal was swiftly rejected.61 In a statement 
broadcast to the East and West German public, Chancellor Kohl expressed his support for the 
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West German absorption of East Germany and the extension of the Basic Law.62 The rejection of 
the German Confederation proposal speaks, to the political power imbalance that defined the 
unification negotiations.  
Along with its impact on the state level, this imbalance was also a point of discussion in 
the private sphere. In my conversation with former a East German citizen, she articulated her 
concern with the West German absorption of the East: “It was almost as if East Germany was 
erased from the map, which was definitely more practical, but, naturally, it left a lot of people 
upset, I believe this is why a lot of people were angry and felt targeted by their government…we 
all felt a bit left behind.” 63 This kind of resentment towards the unified German government 
would later serve as the foundation for the East German critiques of the 1992 Leipzig trial and 
other trials that surfaced in the coming years.  
 Despite some unrest within the East German community, East and West German officials 
pushed forward with plans for complete unification. In order to facilitate the merger, the East 
German Parliament (Volkskammer) passed a resolution on the 23rd of August 1990 declaring the 
accession of the GDR (East German State) to the FRG (West German State), and extending the 
jurisdiction of the West German “Basic Law” to include former East German territory.64 As a 
result, the West German constitution was not amended in any significant way and any attempts at 
merging the two constitutions were set aside.65 Subsequently, high-ranking officials and political 
leaders from the GDR and FRG began negotiations regarding the peaceful judicial, political, and 
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geographical integration of East and West Germany. The negotiations resulted in the signing of 
the “Unification Treaty,” or "Einigungsvertrag" (Unification Treaty),66 which was approved by a 
majority vote in the East and West German governments and signed on the 31st of August 
1990.67  
  Even though this treaty passed, certain historians have identified the Unification Treaty 
as being influenced by western triumphalist sentiments. As historian Peter Quint explains in his 
work The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification, the treaty was 
designed to provide an underlying legal framework for the unification process and the extension 
of the Basic Law’s geographical jurisdiction and the dissolution of the East German 
constitution.68 Quint examines the political implications of the extension of the West German 
“Basic Law” and the dismissal of the East German constitution on the political climate of 
unification. He emphasizes the social and political impact that western dominance had on the 
unified German people, the unification process itself, and, as this chapter will later discuss, the 
trials it produced.69  
 
Rehabilitation and Compensation for Victims of the GDR  
 Political-partisanship extended beyond the boundaries of Berlin’s legal chambers, as anti-
East German sentiments continued to spread throughout the public sphere. Lasting narratives of 
East German inferiority and West German triumphalism in the wake of unification created a 
tense political and social backdrop for the unification process. Narratives of East German 
inferiority, specifically with regard to the state’s legal system, abounded during the unification 
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period, with many formerly West German papers and legal journals, including Der Spiegel and 
Neue Juristischen Wochenschrift, accusing East Germany of being an “Unrechtsstaadt” (unjust 
state).70 This claim was grounded for the most part in West German interpretations of lawless 
and morally reprehensible behavior on the parts of the East German state, officials, and courts, 
particularly with regard to their treatment of political adversaries or dissidents.71 The outrage 
over the maltreatment of GDR victims would soon become one of the primary motivating factors 
behind the unified German trials of that era, including the 1992 Leipzig trial.  
 At the heart of this social criticism was a discussion of the victims of the GDR. When 
asked about those who suffered under the Soviet-run East German regime, one of my formerly 
East German interviewees recognized their plight: “They were treated horribly, and everyone 
knew that. That was part of the reason no one talked about it.” The maltreatment of victims of 
the GDR was obvious to some East German citizens. However, given the constraints of East 
German authoritarian society, it is not surprising that little resulted from this recognition.72  In a 
2014 interview with the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), 
Professor Andreas Maercker, Psychology Professor at the University of Zurich and former GDR 
prisoner recalled the ways in which he was maltreated by Stasi and GDR authorities: Maercker 
specifically recalls instances of “beating, starvation, rape, electric shocks and long periods of 
solitary confinement.”73 According to a survey conducted by the same organization of a number 
of German rehabilitation centers, over 300,000 individuals were affected by these forms of 
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physical and psychological torture under the GDR regime.74 After German unification, the 
victims of the GDR inspired a nationwide campaign to secure reparations and rehabilitation for 
them.  
 Initially, the drive to secure rehabilitation for victims stemmed from demands made by 
the families of the victims, and their personal dedication to amassing evidence against 
perpetrators.75 Victims and surviving relatives sought monetary reparations for their suffering at 
the hands of the East German government76 The fact that these claims regarding East German 
crimes played into the political narratives of East German inferiority propagated by the unified 
German state, made their claims significant in the eye of the state.77 As a result, this campaign to 
secure reparations for GDR criminals was soon picked up by the unified German government 
and transformed into a tool to aid in the unification process. What started as a few, family-based, 
claims for reparations and the punishment of perpetrators grew into much larger, government-
backed, political and legal campaigns.  
In the context of transitional justice literature, academics have scrutinized the significant 
role that reparations, the voices of victims, and the demands of their family have played in the 
construction of new states and the dissemination of political values. In his work Constructions of 
Victimhood: Remembering the Victims of State Socialism in Germany, transitional justice 
historian David Clarke identified the compensation of victims in post-unification Germany as 
bolstering the narratives of western superiority during the unification process.78  As Clarke 
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elucidated in his second chapter on victim compensation, the victims of East German crimes 
“mobilized a construction of their own victimhood that presented their suffering as a heroic 
contribution to the overcoming of state socialism and the eventual reunification of Germany.”79 
Clarke emphasized the political role that victim compensation played in the context of 
unification.  
Similarly, in her work Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Violence, historian Martha Minow examines the various purposes that 
reparations served in the context of transitional justice periods throughout history.80 Citing the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the conclusion of Apartheid and the 
Holocaust reparation campaigns championed by the West German government after the Second 
World War, Minow identifies reparations as “crucial elements” for the restoration of justice, 
community, and nationhood.81 Minow claims that reparations not only help victims and their 
families achieve a sense of justice, but they also help to bind communities together and aid in the 
state-building process.82 In the context of German unification, it would make sense that this 
desire to reestablish a sense of German community and nationhood was paramount to the unified 
German government. In that sense, it follows that this political purpose served as an essential 
motivating factor behind the reparations campaign. Although this is of course not the only 
purpose of these reparation efforts, it is a significant one in the context of my analysis. 
In an attempt to secure reparations for victims of the GDR, West German officials 
inserted a number of clauses discussing victim rehabilitation into the Unification Treaty. For 
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example, article 17 of this treaty outlined a plan for the financial compensation of every 
individual who was considered a “victim of the SED injustice regime…to an appropriate 
extent.”83 This article provided very little specification as to the process of identifying 
appropriate victims and the degree of “appropriate” compensation which they were to be 
afforded.84 In general, it suggested two possible approaches to GDR victim rehabilitation. The 
first approach addressed the issue of the appropriate recipients of monetary reparations. 
According to this approach, only those who had been victims of crimes considered illegal under 
the GDR criminal code at the time should be afforded reparations.85 This meant that the 
reparations were contingent on the historic illegality of the crimes committed, which was 
determined by the GDR criminal code.  
This approach was proposed in an attempt to avoid instances of retroactive justice that 
were expressly forbidden by the Basic Law.86 Around the same time, similar concerns about 
retroactivity permeated judicial discussions in other parts of Europe after the fall of 
communism.87 Scholars in Hungary, for example, campaigned in a similar manner to prevent 
retroactive changes in criminal law.88  However, in response to these requests, the Hungarian 
parliament passed a law which extended the statute of limitations on crimes such as premeditated 
murder and injuries causing death for an indefinite period, so as to allow persecution regardless 
of the historic legality of the crime. According to the Hungarian government, a definite statute of 
limitations “would prevent justice, and leave untouched the perpetrators’ own efforts to 
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consolidate government power as a total shield against accountability.”89 This mindset parallels 
the approach taken in unified Germany to questions regarding the retroactive compensation of 
GDR victims.  
The second approach ignored the historic legality of the crimes committed and 
considered everyone who had been a victim of GDR injustice to be worthy of compensation, 
whether their maltreatment was considered legal in the GDR or not.90 As the unification process 
progressed, a shift towards this approach, which favored the legitimacy of all GDR victims’ 
claims to reparations, as informed by Western human rights standards, occurred as the result of 
popular and political campaigns to delegitimize the DDR.91    
 While the Unification Treaty would have provided a good platform for this discussion of 
GDR victim compensation, the treaty itself, along with the corresponding article, proved too 
vague to offer any specific recommendations about what victims should receive. This was 
partially because the responsibility of managing punishment and providing reparations was one 
that the unified German government was not eager to take on.92 Given that the new government 
was primarily composed of former West Germans or those who no longer felt an allegiance to 
the East German state, it was difficult to compel these officials to pass a reparations law that 
would reallocate thousands of dollars from their own budget to every GDR victim.93 It was 
almost impossible to imagine creating a reparations plan or conducting legal trials without a 
specific indication of who was responsible, who was in need, and how the reparations and 
punishment processes were meant to be conducted. Therefore, it became essential for further 
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legally binding specifications to be made as to how these processes would play out in unified 
Germany.94 The result was the drafting of two specific statutes aimed at addressing exactly these 
concerns, namely the first and second “Statute(s) for the Correction of SED Injustice.”  
 
First and Second Statute(s) for the Correction of SED Injustice 
The first and second “Statute(s) for the Correction of SED Injustice” addressed this 
challenging issue of victim rehabilitation and compensation. The compensation in this context 
was monetary and the rehabilitation of victims included therapeutic resources and aid for those 
who had lost their jobs or struggled to find jobs as a result of prior East German persecution.95 
The first statute focused on the rehabilitation of perceived victims of East German unjust 
convictions as well as financial compensation for these victims. At the heart of this statute was 
the statewide annulment of former GDR convictions and sentences that were deemed unjust by 
the unified German courts. As a formal requirement for this annulment, convictions had to be 
deemed “inconsistent with the essential principles of a free order [and] the rule of law.”96 One of 
the offenses specifically outlined as having met this requirement was the undue persecution of 
individuals based on political orientation. As the first article of the statue lays out, “oppressive 
measures imposed by criminal authorities without a judicial order will also give rise to 
rehabilitation and compensation.”97This statute went into effect on October 29th, 1992.  
The second statute, which went into effect two years later in 1994, was devised in an 
effort to provide compensation for victims of administrative prejudice and employment 
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discrimination at the hands of the East German state.98 While the statutes did not specifically 
outline the mechanisms by which individuals should be prosecuted for their crimes in the GDR, 
they created a legal framework within which claims for retroactive rehabilitation and criminal 
persecution could be processed under unified German law.99  
While the newly unified German state considered the status of victims, it also turned to 
questions regarding the punishment of the East German officials who had committed atrocities in 
the GDR. The first statute for the correction of SED injustice specifically referenced the 1950 
Waldheim trials and the offenses associated with them as a prototypical example of an Article 
One violation.100 As Quint highlights in his analysis of the statutes, the first statute identifies the 
Waldheim trials as “inconsistent with the essential principles of a free order in accordance with 
the rule of law,” which established a legal precedent for the persecution of former Waldheim 
judges and reaffirmed the invalidity of the East German judicial system directing them. 101 By 
identifying the decisions made at Waldheim as crimes worthy of compensation and possible 
rehabilitation for the victims involved, this statute fed into the narrative of East German 
incompetency and judicial illegitimacy proliferated by the unified German government during its 
state-building process.  
Historians who have analyzed this particular moment of transitional justice in Germany 
have identified a variety of ways in which the western government used their legal system to 
exercise their authority over the east. In their works Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post-
Unification Germany and Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification, unification 
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specialists James McAdams and Andrew Bickford make note of the West German state’s use of 
“disqualifying justice” to indirectly punish East German elites. 102 Bickford described 
disqualifying justice, which was a term that McAdams coined during his discussion of the 
unification period, as a form of punishment employed “even if [the East Germans] could not be 
held directly responsible for abuses or illegal actions in the GDR.”103 As part of this punishment, 
McAdams explains that these individuals were disqualified from full rights and participation in 
the new state, based on their past affiliation(s) in the GDR.104 Even though these punitive 
measures were indirect, both Bickford and McAdams stress their importance in the context of the 
trials that followed. This political bias, which influenced the unification process at the state level, 
had a similar influence on the unified German judicial trials of the period, including the 1992 
Leipzig trial and the Border Guards Trials.  
  
Trials of the NVA Border Guards  
 As a consequence of the precedent established by the Statues for the Correction of SED 
Injustice, the unified German state conducted several trials with the intention of holding those 
who had committed atrocities under the East German regime to account.  The “Border Guard 
Trials,” served as a primary reference point for GDR prosecution efforts during the unification 
period. These trials, which were mandated by the unified German government, revolved 
primarily around the criminal prosecution of former NVA (National People’s Army) guards and 
officials charged with the use of deadly force at the Berlin Wall.105 Held in late 1991 and into 
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1992, these trials were the first of their kind in unified Germany, and soon became a prototypical 
example of the state’s attempts at grappling with their communist past.106 Much like the 1992 
Leipzig trial, the prosecution of border guards occurred because of a popular and political push 
to condemn the East German regime during a time in which this condemnation was central to the 
unified German state-building process.107 
 The trials were originally orchestrated in response to the murder of political activist Chris 
Gueffroy, who attempted to cross the Berlin wall only nine months before reunification.108 
According to historian Tina Rosenberg, the unified German government felt compelled to indict 
the four border guards on duty at the time of Gueffroy’s death based on the substantial evidence 
gathered by Gueffroy’s mother in the wake of his death. Additionally, the Border Guard trials 
served as an opportunity to put “on trial both the Berlin Wall and the system that had built it.”109 
Based on this analysis, the trials did more than secure justice for the victims of the accused. They 
also functioned as a means of furthering the new government’s aims to condemn and discredit 
the East German legal and political systems in their entirety.   
 The most common allegations brought against the defendants of the Border Guard Trials, 
namely former guards Ingo Heinrich, Andreas Kuhnpast, Peter-Michael Schmett, and Michael 
Schmidt, were those of either intentional or unintentional homicide.110 Each of the defendants, 
who had at one point stood watch at the Berlin Wall in an attempt to discourage or prevent 
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instances of “Republikflucht” (“desertion”), was held legally responsible for the individuals who 
they had shot at one point during their time on duty.  
Each of the guards relayed a similar story, namely that they had identified a deserter, 
called out a warning with a threat to shoot, and fired a set of warning and eventually fatal 
gunshots thereafter.111 It has been common for the guards to receive praise from their superiors 
higher up in the NVA chain of command in the aftermath of these shootings. However, after 
reunification, these same guards who had once received praise and rewards for their actions were 
now being prosecuted for these actions, publicly shamed, and labeled murderers.112 One of the 
defendants, 27-year-old Ingo Heinrich, told the court “at that time I was following the laws and 
commands of the German Democratic Republic.”113 He was not wrong. The GDR “Border Law” 
of 1982 allowed for the use of deadly force in the case of felonies committed at the state border. 
In this case, party desertions or border crossings were considered felonies under the GDR 
criminal code.114 This clause made Heinrich’s actions legal under the East German criminal 
code.  
 The judge, Theodor Seidel, a former West German resident, disregarded this plea and 
sentenced Heinrich to three and a half years in prison for manslaughter. In a statement read out 
loud as he pronounced his sentence, Seidel explained the reasoning behind his decision: “Not 
everything that is legal is right.”115 This sentencing created a legal precedent for the criminal 
prosecution of individuals who committed morally reprehensible acts within the confines of the 
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East German legal system, despite claims regarding issues of retributive justice. This, in turn, 
established a legal precedent which paved the way for the similar, yet more complex, 1992 
Leipzig trial of Otto Jürgens.  
 As the next chapter discusses, the 1992 Leipzig trial aimed to facilitate the unification 
process, which already had resulted in a great deal of division. While this trial was a clear 
manifestation of West German triumphalism, it helped to establish and proliferate a new standard 
for judicial treatment of the past and new legal norms structured around due process. This, in 
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Chapter 2  
 
Trying the DDR: An Analysis of the 1992 Leipzig trial 
 
 On the morning of November 10th, 1992, a weathered-looking older man shuffled into 
Room 115 of the Leipzig District Court House, flanked by his two lawyers. He moved slowly 
and cautiously, leaning on his lawyer’s arm as he took his seat opposite the executive judge 
Wolfgang Helbig, age 45.116 Reclining back in his chair, he smiled and reached up to remove his 
hearing aid. He placed it on the table and winked at his lawyer.117  
This aged defendant was former East German judge and lawyer Otto Jürgens. At age 86, 
he was being tried for murder and risked spending the rest of his life behind bars. At the time, 
however, his demeanor did not reflect that of a man threatened with years of imprisonment. In 
fact, as the Tageszeitung reporter and legal historian who observed the trial, put it, “he looked 
quite relaxed.”118 Perhaps this was because the crime in question had taken place 42 years 
earlier, under a different regime and legal system, or because the charge itself was rather 
unconventional given the details of the crime. Secure in his perception of his own innocence, 
Jürgens sat back and watched as the proceedings against him unfolded, paying very little 
attention and periodically feigning deafness as his hearing aid sat, unused, on the table in front of 
him.119  
 On that morning, Otto Jürgens was being tried for his part in a set of show trials that had 
taken place 42 years earlier in Waldheim, Saxony. In 1950, Jürgens and the two other judges 
who presided over the infamous Waldheim Trials sentenced the defendant, Heinz Rosenmüller, a 
prosecutor at the Dresden Special Court between 1933 and 1945, to death without any due 
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process.120 Decades later, after German unification, that sentence was redefined and tried as a 
form of murder within the context of an entirely new legal system. The Waldheim trials, in 
which 3,400 alleged Nazis and enemies of the Soviet state were sentenced to death or life 
imprisonment in a series of rapid-fire hearings, had come to be known across Germany as one of 
the darkest chapters of German legal history.121  
In light of the potentially illegitimate death sentences handed out at Waldheim, formerly 
West German prosecutor Dietrich Bauer, who operated within the Leipzig jurisdiction, set about 
accumulating evidence to indict Jürgens and try him for his crimes under the newly established, 
and distinctly Western, unified German legal system.122 Bauer, a 52-year-old prosecutor from 
Stuttgart, first became interested in the Waldheim trials in early 1990 when he discovered 
evidence of Jürgens’ transgressions. As he sifted through hundreds of documents at the recently 
dissolved GDR Interior Ministry, Bauer took an interest in Jürgens’ involvement in the 
Waldheim Trials and was determined to bring him to justice.123 
Based on sources such as the first-hand accounts of eyewitnesses and journalistic reports 
covering the proceedings, this chapter will closely scrutinize the events of the 1992 Leipzig trial.  
Unfortunately, the trial transcripts were not made available in time of this research, which is why 
the chapter depends so heavily on additional primary sources such as eyewitness testimonies and 
in-depth press coverage of the trial proceedings. This chapter will investigate the trial’s 
indictment, proceedings, and sentencing processes, with a focus on the political intentions and 
controversial outcomes of this legal spectacle. As the proceedings illuminate, the 1992 Leipzig 
trial functioned as a political tool for the assertion of the West German legal values of due 
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process, evidence accumulation, and apolitical sentencing. In specific, the transition from the 
charge of murder in the first degree to “perversion of justice,” which is a charge that originated 
in this historical period, highlights the trial’s function as a tool to establish new legal norms.  
 Judicial trials have long been used as a mechanism to redress crimes of the past.124 
Historians who have studied moments of transitional justice in Germany and other countries 
during the post -WWII and post-Cold War periods point to the use of trials in moments of 
political transition as an indicator of a new state’s effort to promote new legal norms and assert 
its faith in the rule of law.125 As transitional justice historian Martha Minow argues in her work 
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence, 
historical redress through judicial trials demonstrates a commitment to “the rule of law,” which 
she defines as a “formal system itself committed to fairness and opportunities for individuals to 
be heard both in accusation and in defense.”126 This interpretation of the law as fair and 
grounded in due process is the product of a liberal legal tradition that emphasizes the importance 
of objectivity, and the 1992 Leipzig trial served as an expression of these values.127  
The use of trials as vehicles to communicate a message about the wrongs committed by a 
previous regime is by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, some of the most famous trials of 
this nature occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War II.128 Historians Martha Minow 
and Pierre Hazan both cite the 1945 Nuremberg Trials, which were a set of trials orchestrated by 
the Allied powers to address the crimes of the Holocaust, as an indicator of the Allies’ desire to 
set a global standard for the treatment of human beings.129  
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Like the Nuremberg Trials, the 1946 Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which involved the Allied 
prosecution of several Japanese WWII war criminals, was foundational in the fields of 
international law and transitional justice. This trial, which has gone down in history as the 
quintessential example of “victor’s justice,” has been scrutinized by many historians analyzing 
the role that the law played in the establishment of new norms for the treatment of “crimes 
against humanity.”130 However, more recent contributions to the scholarship, including David 
Cohen and Yuma Totani’s The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Law, History, and Jurisprudence, 
have complicated this interpretation of the trial by presenting it as a rigorous judicial process 
grounded in the moral and legal norms established by the international democratic community.131 
In the wake of Hitler’s fall, these trials served the political function of communicating new 
norms regarding the handling of human rights abuses such as the Holocaust to the international 
community. Like the Tokyo Trials, the 1992 Leipzig trial was an allegedly rigorous judicial 
process. However, this trial was also informed by political goals as well as specific moral and 
legal values.  
 In the context of post-communist transitional justice efforts, the 1992 Leipzig trial was 
not the only one of its kind. Several trials of this nature occurred in Eastern Europe in the early 
1990s, which renders the Leipzig trial part of a larger international trend that spanned the former 
Soviet bloc. According to historians Nadya Nedelski and Levania Stan, trials condemning the 
actions of communist officials were quite common in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.132 
This was especially the case in countries that constituted the “Soviet Zone” before the bloc’s 
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dissolution, which included Poland, Hungry, the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia, and East 
Germany. 133 These countries used their legal systems to prosecute former communist leaders, 
officials, secret agents, and other “compromised persons occupying certain post-communist 
public positions.”134 Historian David Roman cites these trials as manifestations of the political 
process of “lustration,” or political cleansing.135 In the context of the German unification process, 
“lustration” is an apt characterization of the process of removing former East German elites from 
office and prosecuting them after the regime change.  
The Leipzig trial was different from some of its companion trials in Eastern Europe in 
that it was more than a vehicle for “lustration.” The trial did more than seek to criticize one man 
or displace former political elites. Considering that the Leipzig trial targeted a former judge, this 
chapter argues that the trial had the effect of critiquing the entire East German legal system in 
which Jürgens functioned and adjudicated. Furthermore, since the Waldheim Trials were 
designed as a mechanism to grapple with the crimes of the Nazi regime, parallel to the western 
process of reckoning with Nazism in the Nuremberg Trials, the act of indicting and trying a 
Waldheim judge served as a broader condemnation of the East German state’s approach to 
Germany’s shared Nazi past. The 1992 trial did more than set a standard for the treatment of 
individuals under the unified German legal system: it aided in the legitimization of the unified 
German state and the proliferation of its political values. 
 Amidst the hectic political environment of unification, one might wonder why West 
German prosecutors would take the time and energy to put an East German judge on trial for 
judicial actions taken forty years earlier. Why did the new state consider this trial important or 
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necessary? As historian Mary Fulbrook explains, during the German unification period in the 
early 1990s, the merging of East and West depended on the assertion of West German political 
ideals over those of East Germany.136 The 1992 trial functioned as a key facilitator of this 
transitional process by sending a clear political message that East German judicial practices were 
inferior to those of the West. To that end, the court proceedings themselves reflected and sought 
to demonstrate the due process and apolitical judicial integrity which defined the liberal legal 
values of the early 1990s.137 Ironically, the political purpose of the Leipzig trial negates its claim 
to impartiality, rendering it a clear political tool within the context of unification.  
 
The Indictment  
 After decades of retirement, Otto Jürgens was once again dragged into the limelight after 
West German prosecutor Dietrich Bauer took interest in him and his involvement with the 1950 
Waldheim Trials. 138 According to historian Andrew Bickford, it was common for West German 
lawyers to be involved in the dissolution of former East German legal and governmental offices 
during the reunification period.139 A former West German lawyer remembered how many 
lawyers, possibly including Bauer, were paid quite significant salaries to aid in the process of 
firing and relocating former East German state and legal officials.140  
This was the task that Bauer presumably set out to complete on that day at the GDR 
Interior Ministry, however, his trajectory changed quite quickly when he stumbled across two 
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boxes labeled “Waldheimer Prozesse” housed in the ministry’s archives.141 These boxes 
contained stacks of paperwork detailing the events of the Waldheim Trials and the individuals 
involved. One of those individuals was former judge Otto Jürgens, who became the focal point 
of Bauer’s investigation into the Waldheim Trials, paving the way for the subsequent 1992 
Leipzig trial. 
 Over the course of two years, Bauer scanned the archives in Berlin, Potsdam, and 
Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten to gather as much information on the Waldheim trials as possible.142 
Even though much of the information concerning these trials had been destroyed during the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the purging of East German records, Bauer was able to gather enough 
information to indict the three judges responsible for the judgments they handed out at 
Waldheim.143 The local and national newspapers covering the trials made note of Bauer's very 
apparent preparedness and extensive knowledge of the defendant and the Waldheim Trials. As 
formerly West German Tageszeitung correspondent Julia Albrecht reported, “Bauer has done his 
research, and his occasional smirk at Jürgens sometimes suggests that he could answer the 
questions posed to the accused more accurately than the latter.”144  
 Despite his prominent role as the primary prosecutor in the Leipzig proceedings, little 
information was made public about prosecutor Bauer at the time of the trials. Journalistic 
publications that reported on the trials did not investigate the motivations behind Bauer’s 
determination to prosecute Jürgens. However, as a former West German citizen, Bauer’s political 
orientation likely stemmed from the moral and political values he grew up within West 
                                                
141 “Das waren Blutrichter,” Der Spiegel.  
142 Julia Albrecht, “Waldheim: „Staatlich sanktionierte Lynchjustiz,” Die Tageszeitung, August 26,1993.  
143 Quint, The Imperfect Union, 48.  
144 Albrecht, “Waldheim: „Staatlich sanktionierte Lynchjustiz.”  
 Purvis 40 
Germany. In my interview with formerly a West German journalist, she explained that “many of 
us in West Germany were exposed to political propaganda about East Germans,” and it was not 
uncommon for West German citizens to resent their East German neighbors.145 Even if Bauer did 
not resent Jürgens outright, his sense of morality was likely informed by his West German 
upbringing and the liberal legal tradition. As transitional justice historian Peter Quint elucidates 
in his work The Imperfect Union, many West German citizens considered show trials, such as the 
ones which Jürgens oversaw at Waldheim, to be wrong.146  Furthermore, the West German state, 
like many other modern democratic nations, prided itself on its legal integrity and its 
commitment to justice and impartial truth-seeking when it came to matters of the law.147  
Back in 1950, Jürgens was one of two junior judges who presided over the Waldheim 
Trials. The typical structure of an East German criminal trial required the presence of a senior 
judge to preside over the proceedings, accompanied by two junior judges who assumed the role 
of a jury.148 This meant that all three judges could potentially be identified and held responsible 
for the events at Waldheim. Nevertheless, by the time Bauer had gathered enough evidence to 
indict, the only living judge was Otto Jürgens. There was, however, no statute of limitations 
pertaining to crimes of a high degree in Germany, including murder with intent, or any crimes 
resulting in death, as cited in the German Criminal Code.149  
As a result, it was possible to legally indict the Waldheim judges for the crimes they 
committed 42 years prior by filing an accusation of murder or manslaughter, which is exactly 
what Bauer did. 150 The Waldheim judges had sentenced to death—or killed, as Bauer described 
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it —32 prisoners, including lawyer and journalist Heinz Rosenmüller. After being imprisoned at 
Waldheim, Rosenmüller was executed on the evening of November 4th, 1950.151After two years 
of research, Bauer filed a charge of murder against Jürgens based on the argument that his death 
sentence led to the slaughter of an innocent man.152 The Leipzig District court was then 
compelled to prosecute, considering that an accusation of murder, substantiated by significant 
evidence, had been presented.153   
 According to a reporter who attended the trial and covered it for West German newspaper 
Die Tageszeitung, there was very little governmental pushback when it came to indicting 
Jürgens, even though the crime could be considered a rather unconventional form of murder.154 
German newspapers from the time paid little attention to the indictment, suggesting that it did 
not create a great deal of controversy.155The fact that the state did not challenge the charge 
before the indictment suggests that the unified German government accepted Bauer’s unique 
interpretation of murder in this context.  
 
The Proceedings  
 The Leipzig trial of Otto Jürgens took place over 10 months, with weekly hearings 
consisting of interviews with the defendant and the public presentation of significant amounts of 
evidence against the accused.156 When compared to the Waldheim Trials, which involved the 
sentencing of 3,400 individuals over a period of two months, the 1992 Leipzig trial appears 
painfully thorough.157 In structure, this post-unification trial resembled those of former West 
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Germany, with an emphasis placed on the accumulation of evidence and the establishment of an 
evidentiary record. The similarities between unified German historical trials and their West 
German predecessors point to a deliberate dismissal of East German legal values, as well as the 
continued proliferation of the same legal and political values which informed West German 
historical trials.   
 For example, like its West German predecessors, the 1992 Leipzig trial placed a 
significant degree of importance on establishing an enduring evidentiary record. In West German 
judicial trials, collecting and recording ample evidence over a long course of time was a tool to 
legitimize these trails, and the Leipzig trial adopted the same mechanism.158 In her analysis of 
the West German 1965 Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, historian Rebecca Wittmann describes the 
grueling process of evidence accumulation which was required to indict an individual for 
historical crimes committed during the war.159 It took upwards of five years for the West German 
prosecutors to gather sufficient evidence to indict the accused Nazi criminals during the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials. This evidence, which consisted of eyewitness testimony from 319 
witnesses, was presented over the course of the 183-day long trial.160 Wittmann indicates that 
upon the accumulation of this evidence, the trial proceedings depended on the presentation of 
evidence and arguments from both sides, as well as the continued interrogation of the defendants, 
with designated lawyers assigned to both the defending and prosecuting parties.161   
The 1992 Leipzig trial followed a similar pattern. It took a total of two years for 
prosecutor Bauer to gather enough evidence to indict Jürgens. This evidence included almost 
every piece of documentation associated with the 1950 Waldheim Trials, including a prison 
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report stating the miserable conditions that the Waldheim prisoners had been subjected to, 
witness accounts of the barbaric treatment of the prisoners and the expedited trial proceedings, as 
well as eye-witness accounts of the 32 executions in question.162 This extensive evidentiary base 
not only allowed Bauer to indict Jürgens but also served as a legitimizing record of Jürgens’ 
crimes.  
 In the case of both the West German Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials and the unified German 
Leipzig trial, the prosecuting teams placed a great deal of emphasis on the publication of 
evidence in an effort to legitimize and record both the crimes which had been committed and 
their claims against the perpetrators of those crimes. In the case of the West German Frankfurt 
Auschwitz proceedings, the court went to great lengths to ensure that all 183 days’ worth of 
proceedings and witness accounts were recorded and made publicly available.163 Today, records 
of this trial remain publicly accessible through a free online portal, allowing these trials to go 
down in history as one of Germany’s most poignant and public acts of self-examination.164 By 
projecting this massive amount of evidence and trial documentation to the West German public 
and preserving it for years to come, the West German government was demonstrating their 
commitment to the preservation of victim testimony.  
In a similar vein, the 1992 Leipzig trial was a distinctly public affair, with journalists 
from across the nation reporting on the events of the trials as they unfolded. National newspapers 
such as Die Tageszeitung, Der Spiegel and Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, as well as local 
papers such as Die Leipziger Volkszeitung, all published multiple reports on the trials which 
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detailed the events of the proceedings.165 The amount of evidence presented during the trial was 
substantial, and, as with the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, victim testimony was paramount to the 
Leipzig proceedings. The first six months of the trial were dedicated solely to witness testimony 
about the horrors of the Waldheim Trials. According to reports by Die Tageszeitung on 
December 12, 1992, the court recorded testimony from dozens of former Waldheim inmates who 
were treated inhumanely at the hands of Jürgens and his fellow East German judges.166  
One witness and victim, named Erwin Krombholz, was sentenced to 15 years in prison as 
a “war criminal” in Waldheim on charges of “membership in the National Socialist underground 
organization Wehrwolf.”167 Krombholz was sentenced without any evidence or opportunity for 
defense and was tortured brutally upon his arrival at the prison. According to the court in 
Leipzig, “as a convict, who has been deprived of a defendant’s due rights, he is instrumental in 
taking evidence.”168 In this case, the phrasing “taking evidence” refers to the process of 
constructing a case against Jürgens. The Leipzig court made an effort to put victim testimony at 
the center of the trial proceedings, and the fact that this testimony was considered “instrumental” 
in the process points to the unified German court’s dedication to the preservation of victims’ 
voices. Furthermore, the fact that this testimony was published so widely speaks, again, to the 
state’s interest in establishing an evidentiary record that could legitimize the proceedings and 
make sure the trial and its political lessons about liberal values of due process and evidence 
accumulation entered the German public consciousness.  
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 These judicial norms stood in stark contrast to those of the East German state. East 
German trials, which were the product of a wholly different political system, were largely 
considered legitimate if they effectively represented and showcased the political values of the 
Soviet state.169 In her discussion of East German war-crime trials after the fall of the Nazi 
regime, historian Mary Fulbrook emphasizes that denazification and historical trials in East 
Germany were considered successful if they demonstrated the power of the Soviet state.170 This 
emphasizes the importance that the East German legal system placed on political performance.171  
As historian Jeffrey Herf notes in his work Divided Memories: The Nazi Past in the Two 
Germanies, it made sense that the East German Waldheim Trials did not involve the presentation 
of significant amounts of evidence against the accused or the public exhibition of the trial 
transcripts.172 Unlike their West and unified German counterparts, East German historical trials 
such as the Waldheim Trials were not concerned with the establishment of an evidentiary record 
and instead focused looked to the trial’s ability to function as propaganda tools as a measure of 
legitimacy.173  
These judicial values were not only dismissed but condemned outright by the victorious 
West German state during unification.174 The fact that the structure of the 1992 trial bears a close 
resemblance to West German trials, such as the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, indicates the new 
state’s prioritization of the Western legal tradition after the fall of the wall. As Tageszeitung 
reporter Julia Albrecht argued, the Leipzig trial aimed at criticizing the East German legal 
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system and revealing its politicization and subsequent “bastardization of justice.”175 This critique 
depends on a West German approach to justice, which prided itself on its neutrality and fairness.   
Universally adopted liberal legal notions such as “judicial neutrality” and impartial 
adjudication for unbiased sentencing were integral elements of German legal practices during the 
unification period.176 In the case of the 1992 Leipzig trial, the extensive record gathered against 
Jürgens, the significant time devoted to witness testimony, and the procedures followed during 
the trial to ensure that Jürgens due process rights were upheld, all demonstrated the Leipzig 
trial’s efforts to ensure that Jürgens had an objectively fair trial, in the liberal sense. According to 
a journalist who attended the courtroom sessions, the prolonged deliberation and extensive 
amount of evidence presented during the 1992 trial speak to the court’s dedication to “finding the 
truth” and proving it in an objective manner.177 This emphasis on impartial sentencing stands in 
stark contrast to the political “show trials” of East Germany, the most obvious example of which 
were the Waldheim Trials.178  
 The Leipzig trial’s commitment to due process and desire to establish new legal norms 
was perhaps most clear when, in a surprising twist during the third month of the trial, prosecutor 
Bauer dropped the charges of murder due to a lack of evidence against Jürgens specifically. As a 
press release published by the Leipzig District Court stated:  
The accused 86-year-old judge could not be shown with absolute certainty that he actually 
voted for the death penalty in 1950. Therefore, the legal principle applies "in dubio pro 
reo" - in case of doubt for the accused, and the accusation of a legal violation and the severe 
deprivation of liberty remains. 179 
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As a secondary judge in the Waldheim cases, Jürgens' power in the courtroom was 
limited to his ability to advise the primary judge, or chairman.180 As a result, it was difficult to 
indict Jürgens as the primary orchestrator of the murder.  
In place of the accusation of murder, Bauer shifted focus and brought two new official 
charges against Jürgens, namely “perversion of justice” and “deprivation of liberty,” both of 
which were not bound by a statute of limitations.181 In the early 1990s, it was quite common for 
former GDR political and legal officials to be scrutinized  for depriving Soviet citizens of their 
right to “liberty” or for participating in judicial acts, such as show trials, which constituted a 
“perversion of justice.”182 The very notion of a right to liberty is grounded in liberal notions of 
civil rights. In this sense, this legal accusation was grounded in the political values of the new 
liberal government. Similarly, as Peter Quint explains, the concept of a “perversion of justice” in 
this context refers to “political justice,” which establishes a causal link between politicization 
and judicial failure.183  
This value of apolitical justice is a central tenet of the liberal legal tradition. Legal 
scholars Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns state in their work History, Memory, and the Law 
that “the classic, liberal conception of justice requires impartial adjudication of claims and 
accusations.”184 This impartiality implies that the law should occupy a space above politics, a 
notion which the majority of individuals in today’s liberal societies are familiar with. Therefore, 
the transition from the charge of murder in the first degree to “perversion of justice” highlights 
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the 1992 trial’s function as a tool to establish new legal norms grounded in liberal values of 
apolitical justice.  
On August 26, 1993, prosecutor Bauer stood before the judges and the rows of reporters 
eagerly waiting for his comments and presented his closing statement to the court.185 “It was a 
state-sanctioned lynching,” Bauer said of the Waldheim Trials. “Nothing was proven, yet blood 
ran down the street that night in Waldheim.”186 In this statement, and throughout the trial, the 
prosecution focused heavily on the Waldheim Trial’s lack of due process in an effort to highlight 
the lack of judicial integrity displayed by Jürgens and the legal system that supported him. While 
the initial charge brought against Jürgens was that of premeditated murder, Bauer later focused 
the majority of his argument against Jürgens on the lack of evidence presented during the 
Waldheim Trials.  
Bauer argued that the Waldheim Trials were purely political and conducted with the 
intention of furthering the Soviet agenda, not achieving justice.187 In his conclusion, Bauer 
emphasized that “mere membership in one of the various organizations during the Nazi era was 
enough for a conviction.”188 This statement was designed to substantiate Bauer’s ultimate claim 
that the trials were unjust because they had prioritized the Soviet political values over justice and  
due process for individual defendants. Both local and international press reports on the trial 
noted the lack of evidence and due process.189  Additionally, Bauer cited the “fast-track” 
hearings which were exceedingly rushed and conducted “without witnesses, without evidence, 
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and almost always without a defense lawyer.”190 The only cause for prosecution was a “protocol 
handed down from the Soviets,” and very little regard was paid to the truth.191 This disregard for 
“proper” and unbiased judicial procedure was at the core of Bauer’s argument against Jürgens. In 
this closing statement, Bauer set a standard for judicial practices in unified Germany, a standard 
which is dependent on the presence of an evidentiary record, apolitical sentencing, and due 
process for the accused.  
 
The Verdict  
 “Herr Jürgens, can you hear me?” On the 30th of August 1993, Leipzig Court judge 
Wolfgang Helbig addressed defendant Jürgens with a note of concern in his voice.192 “I repeat, 
Mr. Jürgens, can you hear me?” Silence, once more. After a gesture from Helbig, Jürgens’ 
lawyer clapped his hands right under his defendant’s nose. Finally, the accused Otto Jürgens, 86, 
gestured in response: Yes, he hears. “Did you also hear the prosecutor's plea?” Again, silence.193 
After another desperate glance from his council, Jürgens retrieved his hearing aid, which had 
been resting on the table in front of him every day for the last 10 months, and reinserted it. After 
a break in the negotiations, Helbig resumed proceedings with the assumption that Jürgens had 
been able to follow the plea after the reinsertion of his, clearly necessary, hearing aid. “We shall 
continue then with the reading of the verdict,” stated Helbig in a much more confident manner. 
Jürgens looked exceedingly displeased.194  
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 After 10 months of hearings and deliberations, West German executive judge Wolfgang 
Helbig reached a verdict and sentenced Jürgens to two years’ probation. Like prosecutor Bauer, 
judge Helbig, who was 48 years old the time, was a practicing lawyer and judge in West 
Germany and retained his position during unification, a luxury which most East Germans were 
not afforded.195 In a final statement to the court and press, Judge Helbig explained his verdict:  
According to the Leipzig Regional Court, the judge Otto Jürgens was involved in 
the infamous Waldheim trials in 1950 in the conviction of more than 3,400 
alleged war criminals. In rapid legal proceedings contrary to the rule of law, the 
prisoners interned by the Soviet occupying powers were each sentenced in ten 
minutes too long prison terms or to death. The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) finds 
Jürgens guilty of participating in the Waldheim Trials with deliberate disregard of 
procedural rules and drastic impairment of the basic defense rights of the accused. 
The sum of these willful violations of the law, each of which alone constitutes a 
perversion of justice according to section 244 stGB-GDR (GDR Criminal 
Code).196  
 
In the end, the “perversion of justice” (Rechtsbeugung) charge stood out as the most 
significant to the court. This was also the charge that West German and international newspapers 
emphasized in their coverage of the trial.197 Articles in the British paper Reuters News and The 
Associated Press place this charge, along with the “deprivation of liberty,” charge front and 
center. In her article, “East German Judge Guilty of Perverting Justice in War Trials,”  
Reuters News correspondent Bettina Vestring focused her analysis of the trial on the perversion 
of justice charge and its link to political “show trials.”198 Similarly, Kevin Costelloe of The 
Associated Press linked this charge to the assertion of liberal legal values of due process when he 
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stated that the perversion of justice charge, among other aspects of the trial, indicated that “the 
[unified German] government [had] taken pains to note that it [was] pursuing him for lack of due 
process.”199 As this response indicated,  the use of this charge underscored the new government’s 
intentions to set new judicial standards through the performance of the 1992 Leipzig trial.   
The Leipzig trial’s “perversion of justice” charge created a framework and pathway for 
other trials in unified Germany designed to communicate new legal norms.200 In his work The 
Imperfect Union, unification historian Peter Quint suggests that  “thousands of cases of suspected 
perversion of justice by former GDR judges have been investigated in Berlin alone.”201 The 1992 
Leipzig trial was one of the first formal applications of this charge in Germany; it offered a way 
for the newly-unified government to hold GDR criminals to account for the politically biased 
nature of East German judicial practices.202 The desire to do so on the part of the unified German 
government speaks to its commitment to establishing new legal norms grounded in values of 
evidence accumulation and due process and illuminates the state’s intentions to use their legal 
system as a tool in this political process.   
The evolution of the perceived role of the law during this period of transition 
reflects the integral relation between Germany’s legal system and political structure after 
unification. When the political environment of a state goes through a transition such as 
the unification process, the legal system follows suit.203 This concept of regime 
dependent legal systems was at the core of Jürgens’ defense. In a statement made to East 
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German newspaper Neues Deutschland after the verdict was declared, Jürgens stated that 
he “felt that he had done nothing wrong.” He complained that “what was right back then 
[in East Germany] could be wrong today.”204 Jürgens highlighted the fluidity of legal 
norms in Germany and how those norms depended on the regime in power.  
To conclude this chapter, it should be noted that, in the context of a politically turbulent 
period such as unification, it seems odd to devote energy to a trial such as the one which 
occurred in Leipzig in 1992. However, as this chapter argues, this trial served several important 
political functions including facilitated the merger and the state-building process in unified 
Germany by promoting western judicial ideals and condemning those of the east. The 1992 
Leipzig trial functioned both as a manifestation of the unified German state’s liberal legal norms 
and as an educational tool designed to proliferate West German values. As such, the trial itself 
served as a site for conveying new legal and political norms structured around due process and 
evidence accumulation. In this sense, the 1992 Leipzig trial illuminated the way in which the law 
in unified Germany became part of the broader political processes of state-building.  
 Regardless of the political motivations behind the trial, the Leipzig investigation and 
court events galvanized the German public. In the months leading up to the hearings, Otto 
Jürgens’ story captured the nation’s attention, with journalists across Germany calling the 
hearings a “unique historical event.”205 The next chapter will explore how the journalistic 
coverage of the trial introduced divergent interpretations that largely depended on the politically 
charged public sphere and the reporters’ orientations. 
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Chapter 3 
A Divided Public: The Reception of the 1992 Leipzig trial  
 
 “Quiet down back there!” Judge Wolfgang Helbig’s command echoed through the 
wooden chamber in Room 115 of the Leipzig District Courthouse. This direction was aimed at a 
group of older men, sitting in the back of the courtroom, murmuring disapprovingly as judge 
Helbig read his verdict to the court.206 Former Waldheim Judge Otto Jürgens had been sentenced 
to only two years’ probation on the charges of perversion of justice and the deprivation of 
liberty.207 When Helbig announced the sentence, the men scoffed, prompting yet another 
reprimand from the judge. Eventually, the old men removed themselves, slamming the door 
angrily behind them.208 
 This group of men, who sporadically attended sessions of the 1992 Leipzig trial, were 
most likely elder residents of the recently disbanded East German state.209 According to a 
Tageszeitung journalist, who was present at the courtroom when the sentence was pronounced, 
these elder East Germans had come to support Jürgens in his fight for freedom.210 In appearance, 
these men resembled aged defendant Jürgens quite closely, and their disapproving murmurs and 
occasional outbursts during prosecutor Bauer’s presentations showed that they disapproved of 
the trial.211  
 By the end of the trial, the German public was profoundly divided about how to perceive 
the verdict. Certain former East Germans viewed the trial as a manifestation of West German 
triumphalism and a mere exercise of victor’s justice, while some former West Germans critiqued 
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the trial for the leniency of Jürgens’ sentence and for what they perceived as its purpose as a 
pedagogical tool designed to demonstrate the new state’s political ideologies. Whether this trial 
functioned as a form of victor’s justice or as an educational tool, the German public recognized 
the political goals of the 1992 Leipzig trial. This chapter explores the public critiques of the trial 
and the political divide which defined them. The political debate engendered by the Leipzig trial 
demonstrates that the trial functioned as an element of the state-building process in unified 
Germany.  
 
East German Perspective: Victor’s Justice Critique  
The dissatisfied individuals who graced the courtroom in Leipzig that day represented a 
much larger group of displaced former East Germans who felt personally threatened by the 
unification process and, as a lawyer who I interviewed put it, the “West’s occupation of the 
East.”212 
Historian Andrew Bickford argues that former West German elites made use of many 
“repressive” tactics, including selective hiring and disqualifying justice, to silence former East 
Germans and strip them of any political voice or social mobility.213 The Tageszeitung journalist 
noted that these harsher aspects of the unification processes, such as removing East German 
officials from positions of power and the dismantling of East German businesses, left certain 
former East Germans feeling displaced and resentful towards their new western government and 
the unification process as a whole.214  This resentment towards the unification process was 
                                                
212 Anonymous, interview.; Bickford, Fallen Elites,10. 
213 Ibid, 10-11.   
214 Anonymous, interview.  
 Purvis 55 
manifested through the critique of government-orchestrated trials, which occurred in the early 
1990s and were designed to criticize the East German legal system.  
At the heart of these critiques was the accusation of victor’s justice. This specific 
accusation, which refers to the unjust prosecution of one party based on the political values of 
another party, emphasizes the hypocritical and politically biased nature of the newly dominant 
legal system.215 In their work History, Memory, and the Law, legal historians Austin Sarat and 
Thomas Kearns argue that in the context of a democratic triumph over another ideology, such as 
fascism or communism, this critique calls into question the objectivity of the new state’s legal 
choices and serves as a criticism of the legal system itself.216  
While this critique was eventually applied to the 1992 Leipzig trial, the first trial of this 
nature to be criticized for victor’s justice was the 1991 Border Guard Trial.  According to the 
Tageszeitung journalist,  many former East Germans viewed the Border Guards Trial, and 
eventually the 1992 Leipzig trial, as “personal attacks” on East Germany and its values as a 
state.217 Tina Rosenberg reports that some East Germans saw the Border Guard Trials simply as 
a way for the West Germans to express their dominance over East Germans.218 Rosenberg cites 
David Gill, a former East German government official, as having expressed that “the Wessis 
(East German slang for West Germans) feel that they won history and can do what they want.”219 
As Rosenberg put it, “to these individuals, the trial… was victor’s justice.”220 This demographic 
was distressed by both the Border Guard Trial’s clear dismissal of the East German state’s legal 
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system and its political legitimacy, and the press articles which covered the trials speak to this 
critique.221 As this chapter goes on to discuss, former East Germans also interpreted the 1992 
Leipzig trial as a manifestation of victor’s justice in that it used the law as a tool for Western 
political gain. Therefore, the targeting of GDR criminal trials for perceived victor’s justice 
represented a larger trend during the unification period, of which the Border Guard Trial and the 
Leipzig trial were a part.  
The unified German press quickly became an arena for the subtle expression of these 
sentiments. In particular, former East German newspaper Neues Deutschland targeted these trials 
and their outcomes as part of their critique of the unification process. Very few former East 
German newspapers survived the dissolution of the East German state.222 However, as journalist 
Charley Wilder wrote in his Der Spiegel article discussing East German de-legitimization during 
unification, Neues Deutschland remained as one of the quintessential eastern leaning papers in 
unified Germany and the most prominent source on the Eastern perspective during unification.223 
Therefore, the way in which the 1992 Leipzig trial was discussed in this paper shines a light on 
the eastern public’s response to the trial.  
In the case of this paper, the reporters articulated a subtle version of the victor’s justice 
critique by undermining the objectivity of the prosecution and emphasizing the innocence of the 
defendant, in this case, Otto Jürgens. The articles published in Neues Deutschland at the time of 
the trial focused a great deal on prosecutor Bauer’s western perspective, which had the effect of 
implying that he was politically biased. Shortly after Judge Helbig announced his verdict in 
1993, Neues Deutschland published a piece subtly critiquing the primary prosecutor and 
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orchestrator of the trial. In the article, the unnamed author stressed Bauer’s identity by referring 
to him as “aufgewachsene West-Jurist Bauer” (“the West German prosecutor Bauer”) and he 
went on to restate Bauer’s political orientation and citizenship multiple times throughout the 
piece, almost to the point of unnecessary repetition. 224  
Similarly, another Neues Deutschland article published a few months later referred to 
Bauer as a “West-Jurist,” or a “Western Judge.”225 Bauer’s upbringing and political orientation 
were not reflected in any of the West German articles that were published at the same time. 
According to a West German lawyer who I interviewed, the term “West-Jurist” in a publication 
with East German origins is subtly derogatory in that it emphasizes the prosecutor’s political bias 
where they should not be one.226 As one of my interviewees put it, this phraseology is “exactly 
what I would expect from an East German paper.”227  
Neues Deutschland’s emphasis on Bauer’s West German orientation was coupled with an 
empathy for Otto Jürgens that reflected another subtle form of critique of the 1992 Leipzig trial. 
A Neues Deutschland article from May 7th, 1993 raised questions about the prosecution and 
Jürgens’ sentence by focusing on the testimony of one of the few witnesses in the trial who 
defended the proceedings at Waldheim.228  Sixty-eight-year-old Helga Tiedt, who had worked as 
a clerk during the Waldheim Trials, told the court that “the accused were treated properly, were 
not beaten, were allowed to sit down and comment on the accusations against them.”229 Given 
the well-documented nature of the Waldheim proceedings and the treatment of the prisoners--
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treatment that a 1950 Amnesty International Report described as “akin to an internment camp,” 
Tiedt’s testimony was not particularly compelling.230 Yet, Neues Deutschland failed to include 
the evidence that undermined Tiedt’s testimony.231 By placing her testimony front and center,  
the article appears to be critiquing the 1992 trial as unfair and unnecessary, given the supposedly 
“fair” treatment of Waldheim prisoners.  
 In the same vein of argumentation, several other Neues Deutschland articles pointed to 
defendant Jürgens’ age as a way of underscoring the unnecessary nature of the trial. The majority 
of a short article published on August 26th, 1993 focuses on a discussion of the defendant’s age 
and frailty.232 As the first paragraph (of the two-paragraph article) read: 
The 41st day of proceedings before the First Criminal Senate of the District Court of 
Leipzig in the trial against the 86-year-old former Waldheim judge Otto Jürgens began 
with a delay of two hours: the defendant's hearing aid failed to work and judge Wolfgang 
Heibig had to get a replacement.233  
 
In this context, Neues Deutschland painted a picture of Jürgens as a frail elderly man, and 
this characterization made up the majority of the article.234 Another article from the same time 
made note of Jürgens’ poor physical health, noting his “frail” physique and describing him as a 
“poor old man,” as if his age or health status delegitimized his prosecution.235 Out of the more 
than 20 articles published in Neues Deutschland about the trial, 18 of them included a substantial 
discussion of Jürgens’ age and poor physical health.236 Although subtle, this focus encouraged 
sympathy for Jürgens and suggested that the unified German prosecution was unnecessary. 
 The final technique that these articles used to highlight the western bias of the trial was to 
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emphasize Jürgens’ personal perspective in a way that reinforced his innocence. The author of 
one Neues Deutschland article introduced Jürgens by noting that he had “no criminal record”237 
and highlighted Jürgens’ claim that he “did nothing wrong.”238 This sentiment was echoed in two 
additional articles, one published in Neues Deutschland in 1992 and another in 1997. The earlier 
article, entitled “Waldheim “-Richter: Ich war nicht SED-gelenkt,” (Waldheim Judge: I was not 
controlled by SED) was entirely devoted to Jürgens’ defense.239 The article revolved around an 
interview that took place at Jürgens’ house, making it the only article at the time to include an 
interview with the defendant outside of the courtroom. As the title suggests, the article focused 
on Jürgens’ belief that he was not a Soviet puppet, and his actions were entirely legal at the 
time.240 Another article, published five years later, made the same argument about Jürgens’ 
innocence. The article, entitled “Ich Fühle Mich Nicht Schuldig” (“I do not feel guilty”), focused 
entirely on Jürgens’ claim that his actions were legal under Soviet law and that he should not be 
prosecuted.241 The combination of this East German paper’s extraordinary focus on Bauer’s 
political perspective, Jürgens’ age, and the validity of his defense speaks to its criticism of the 
unified German legal system’s political bias and the paper’s portrayal of  Jürgens’ trial as a form 
of West German victor’s justice. These critiques, however, were subtly expressed.  
 The standards for German media during unification prevented many journalists from 
expressing their concerns about the trial more openly. According to the Tageszeitung journalist, 
the press’ dedication to objectivity, whether they were Western or Eastern leaning in their 
political orientation, prevented them from making any obvious claims for or against any 
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particular political party.242 Therefore, it was rare to find newspaper articles that blatantly 
critiqued the trials, and, as with the Neues Deutschland article, any hint of a political leaning had 
to be quite subtle. As media historian Agnieszka Szymanska notes in her work “Do the Media 
Really Support the German Reunification?,” the new German government at the time of 
unification encouraged former East and West German press agencies to avoid biased writing in 
an effort to prevent tensions which might arise from the merging of the two states.243 Szymanska 
affirms that in the early 1990s, the media’s role was to facilitate unification by encouraging 
unity, not sowing discord. 244 As a result, the Tageszeitung journalist  insisted that those 
journalists who were displeased by the trial either expressed their discordant beliefs subtly, as 
was the case with Neues Deutschland articles or in private writings and conversations.245  
This concern about openly expressing a critical opinion on these trials extended into the 
private sphere as well. One elderly former East German man who told me that the 1992 trial was 
an “obvious example of Western victor’s justice” insisted on remaining anonymous.246 This East 
German’s request to remain anonymous more than thirty years after the trial is a noteworthy 
example of a continued reluctance to criticize the western government openly. 
The East German victors’ justice critique emphasized the way in which the 1992 trial was 
influenced by the politics of unification. Coverage in Neues Deutschland suggests that the former 
East German press found ways to subtly express their displeasure with the Western-oriented 
unified German government and to portray the 1992 trial as a political tool designed to 
delegitimize the East German legal system.  
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Western Perspective: Leniency Critique  
 Former East Germans were not the only ones to criticize the 1992 Leipzig trial. Certain 
West-leaning German citizens developed a very different critique of the trial. Rather than 
offering sympathy towards the elderly Jürgens or suggesting he might be innocent, critiques from 
the west focused on the leniency of Jürgens’ sentence. These individuals saw two years’ 
probation and a fine for a man who was originally indicted for murder as a very light sentence 
and an unnecessarily tolerant response to what they viewed as the serious crimes committed at 
Waldheim.247 These critics argued that the trial of Otto Jürgens was more of a political 
performance, designed to establish the state’s new political and legal values than a criminal trial 
held to punish East German offenders. 248  
 The leniency critique, which was pioneered primarily by former West Germans, 
suggested that the unified German government was unable to properly prosecute Jürgens as a 
criminal because of its political agenda and commitment to the unification and state-building 
processes. The verdict, which was only two-years-probation and a fine of 6000 Deutsche Marks, 
allowed Jürgens to essentially walk free and, as Tageszeitung reporter Julia Albrecht put it, “take 
the train back to his home in Halle” the day he was convicted.249 To some former West Germans 
and East German defectors, this was insufficient punishment for what was originally a murder 
charge. This critique had a similar effect to the East German’s claim of victor's justice in that it 
highlighted the unified German government’s use of the trial as a political tool, in this case, to 
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encourage cooperation and establish new legal norms grounded in the democratic ideology of the 
new state.  
  This argument, made primarily by West German journalists, may be valid in the context 
of the unified German state’s push for amnesty for former East German officials.250 On April 22, 
1993, Prominent SED (Socialist Democratic Party) official Egon Bahr, requested amnesty for all 
GDR criminals in an effort to accelerate the “inner unification” process in Germany.251 These 
amnesty discussions formed the political backdrop for the 1992 Leipzig trial, and Jürgens’ 
sentence, which was declared the same year as Bahr’s call for amnesty, was most likely 
influenced by this political motivation to encourage unity and grant amnesty.  
 Unified Germany was not the only state that deployed amnesty as an approach to 
facilitate transitional justice and the construction of a new state and body politic. Historian 
Martha Minow cites the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was 
established after the nation's break from Apartheid, as an example of the effective capacity of 
amnesty and forgiveness to build bridges and unite a nation under its new leadership.252 
Similarly, historian Paloma Aguilar cites the transition of power which occurred in Spain after 
the death of fascist dictator Francisco Franco as the optimal opportunity to move on and forget 
the crimes of the past. In her monograph Memory and Amnesia, Aguilar argues that if a conflict 
arises within a nation regarding the nature of past events, it is “almost impossible to build a 
common future, or achieve social harmony and political stability.”253 These analyses further 
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illuminate the possible social complications which the unified German government had to 
consider when making the choice to pursue criminal prosecution in place of amnesty.  
 Despite these calls for amnesty, West German-leaning media outlets still scrutinized 
certain unified German judicial trials for their leniency.  At the end of May 1993, a year after 
Jürgens’ trial began, former East German president Hans Modrow was convicted for election 
fraud committed during his time in office, and his light sentence was just as unpopular.254 
Similarly to Jürgens, Modrow was sentenced to a “caution” (Verwarnung), which is the lightest 
possible sentence for a criminal charge.255 In response to public complaints, the German Federal 
Court (Die Bundesgerichtshof) repealed the mild judgment on the grounds that Modrow’s actions 
were deliberately nefarious.256 
In a public statement, the court noted that “it was the goal of the electoral manipulation to 
cover up the real number of opposing votes…in order to suppress the extent of the dissenting 
electorate that had turned against...the oppressive control of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany).”257 The West German-dominated Federal Court emphasized the extent of Modrow’s 
wrongdoing in hopes of securing a more significant sentence. However, upon re-sentencing, 
Modrow still avoided imprisonment, receiving instead a sentence of nine months’ probation. 258 
According to Quint, this sentence did not satisfy those who had called for the initial 
resentencing.259 However, the judge’s leniency did serve a political purpose in the context of 
reunification. Given that Modrow’s sentence was read only a month after some of the initial calls 
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for amnesty were first expressed, it is likely that his trial functioned more as a performative 
declaration of the state’s intention to facilitate unification than a punitive trial.260  
The responses to Modrow’s sentencing set the stage for the 1992 Leipzig trial and its 
leniency critique. As was the case with the East German critique, the West German analysis of 
the 1992 Leipzig trial as too lenient was most clearly expressed in the press. In order to 
emphasize the leniency of the trial, western leaning newspapers such as the Nürnberger 
Nachrichten and Der Spiegel focused their coverage of the trial on the illegality and severity of 
Jürgens’ crimes at Waldheim in order to establish the need for a serious legal response. 
However, in the end, the trial was critiqued for its failure to serve this purpose.  
An article in the Nürnberger Nachrichten, one of Germany’s largest regional newspapers 
based in Nuremberg, emphasized defendant Jürgens’ guilt in the face of the charges.261  Jürgens, 
the paper wrote, “was able to see the illegality of his actions, yet he chose to commit the crimes, 
which he did intentionally.”262 Furthermore, Jürgens did so without “showing a sense of guilt” 
(Schuldbewußtsein zeigt er nicht).263 This characterization of Jürgens as guilty and worthy of 
criminal prosecution contrasts strongly with the East German interpretation of Jürgens and the 
trial itself.  This characterization, which is echoed in several other articles published in the 
Nürnberger Nachrichten, did the work of establishing the severity of Jürgens’ criminality, which 
was glossed over in East German newspapers at the time, so as to underscore the need for a 
verdict which matched the crime. As expressed in another western leaning newspaper, Der 
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Spiegel, the 1992 trial failed to accomplish this necessary purpose which underscored its lenient 
nature. 264 
At the time of the trial, Der Spiegel published pieces that focused heavily on the abuses 
which occurred during the Waldheim Trials in order to underscore the need for significant 
judicial repercussions.  An article published in Der Spiegel described the Waldheim Trial as 
being “among the darkest chapters in German justice.” 265 The unnamed author followed this 
characterization with an in-depth discussion of the abuses which occurred at Waldheim, 
including the intentional “murder” of 32 victims.266 Similarly, another article published in Der 
Spiegel in 1992 described Jürgens’ crimes in detail, claiming that  Jürgens and his fellow judges 
were “blood judges” (“Blutrichter”) and that “blood actually flowed” on the night of the 
murder.267 In this sense, the newspaper focused on the severity of Jürgens’ crimes by accepting 
Bauer’s interpretation of the death-sentences as murder, therefore establishing the need for a trial 
that addressed these injustices.  
However, according to this western-leaning newspaper, the 1992 trial failed in this 
regard. At the end of the article, the author characterized the 1992 trial as a “fruitless attempt to 
legally deal with injustice.”268 The author made this claim before the verdict was read. However, 
to the author, it was clear that the charge of “murder,” although legitimate in their eyes, would be 
dropped in favor of a less significant change. The author correctly predicted this development in 
the trial but was so sure of the trial’s lenient and performative nature that they published this 
critique a year before the verdict was even announced.269   
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 These subtle critiques of the trial’s necessary, yet lenient, nature were further 
substantiated by articles published in western-leaning law journals at the time. Unlike 
newspapers such as Der Spiegel and Neues Deutschland, unified German law journals were 
much more forthcoming in their reaction to the trials that took place as part of the unification 
process.  
In an article published shortly after the conclusion of the Leipzig trial in the Frankfurt-
based legal journal Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), for example, West German legal 
analyst Ernst Wolf  described Helbig’s sentencing as “ineffective” given that it illustrated the 
Federal Court’s willingness to “overlook the gross human rights violations exhibited during the 
Waldheim Trials.”270 Wolf emphasized the magnitude of Jürgens’ crimes and accused Helbig 
and the Federal Court of settling on a sentence that did not reflect the seriousness of his actions. 
Wolf argued that the lenient sentence was most likely in service of the unification process, as the 
new government was primarily concerned at this point with smoothing over East and West 
German relations during the unification of the two states.271 The sentence, he charged, aimed to 
facilitate relations between former East and West Germany.272 But, as Wolf saw it, this political 
purpose “did not warrant the dismissal of a crime such as Jürgens’.” The lenient sentence 
demonstrated an “inappropriate” degree of politicization.273 It made clear that Jürgens’ trial was 
a political performance that prioritized facilitating unification over, as Wolf put it, the “honest 
realization of justice.” 274  
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Similarly, in 1995, legal analyst Günter Bemmann published an article in the western-
oriented legal journal Juristen Zeitung that critiqued the 1992 verdict for its leniency. 
Throughout the article, Bemmann referenced the trial’s “inadequacy” and critiqued the 
Bundesgerichtshof (the district court) for its failure to achieve justice through such “forgiving” 
sentencing.275 In a brief analysis of this article, Peter Quint refers to Bemmann’s piece as a 
“bitter attack on [the verdict] for its leniency to the GDR judges and its willingness to accord 
some respect to the GDR judicial system.”276 In the context of western-leaning legal journals, 
which were less widely available to the public, the critiques of the trial’s leniency were much 
more obvious. Whether it was through a focus on the significance of the crimes at Waldheim and 
the need for an equally significant legal response or the outright identification of the trial 
proceedings and insufficient, the local western response to the 1992 Leipzig trial was concerned 
with issues of leniency.  
This critique, however, highlights an especially significant political function of the 1992 
Leipzig trial. As Quint points out, the Leipzig trial was being used by the unified German 
government “for purposes of public education.”277 As a trial of a trial, Jürgens’ proceedings 
simultaneously called into question the legitimacy of the East German state’s legal practices and 
set a standard for how trials should be done in the future.  
Coverage in newspapers with West German origins highlighted the educational role of 
the 1992 trial. According to historian Mary Fulbrook, in moments of political transition, an 
important part of the establishment of new legal and political norms is the public dismissal of 
                                                
275 Günter Bemmann, "Zu Aktuellen Problemen Der Rechtsbeugung," Juristen Zeitung, 1995.  
276 Quint, Imperfect Union, 414. This discussion was very brief and occurred in a footnote.  
277 Ibid., 210.   
 Purvis 68 
those of the previous regime.278 Certain western-leaning German newspapers appear to have 
served this political function. A Nürnberger Nachrichten article published at the time of the trial 
made a point of criticizing not only Jürgens but the East German legal system itself.279 By 
describing Jürgens and as one of two “People's judges” who “were the semi-skilled, politically 
trained helpers of the chairmen in trials like those at Waldheim,” the article cast dispersions on 
the East German legal system, its organization, and its legitimacy. 280 This critique of Jürgens 
and the East German state served to bolster the legitimacy of the unified German legal system 
and the government’s intentions to prosecute Jürgens.   
International media commentary on the Leipzig trial, while scant, also functioned as a 
public condemnation of the East German legal system.281 A piece by Bettina Vestring for British 
outlet Reuters News described Jürgens as having been “inadequately trained in the law, having 
failed his examinations twice. He was eventually made a prosecutor and judge nonetheless.”282 
This criticism served to undermine the legitimacy of the East German legal system while 
propping up that of the newly unified state.  
In this sense, the 1992 trial functioned as an educational tool designed to proliferate the 
values of the new government and facilitate the unified German state-building process.283 Mary 
Fulbrook argues that the act of establishing new standards of justice and undermining those of 
the previous regime aids in the formation of a new state.284  Historians who have studied East 
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and West German state-building processes note how the two states used their legal systems to 
legitimize their political and judicial efforts, especially regarding the treatment of the Holocaust, 
through trials such as the Waldheim and Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials.285 This legacy of trials as 
political tools in moments of transition informed the German unification process as well, making 
the establishment of new legal norms and the rejection of past ones essential aspects of the 
unified German state-building process.  
In the context of a broader discussion of transitional justice trials around the world, Peter 
Quint cites the 1992 Leipzig trial as a quintessential example of a performative, political trial.286 
This is especially significant given that one of Leipzig prosecutor Bauer's main critiques of the 
Waldheim trials was its politically performative nature. It is this paradox that makes the Leipzig 
trial an especially interesting historical occurrence. While the trial did not necessarily unite the 
German people in a time when the government was calling for unity, it did send a clear message 
about the unified German government’s approach to both remembering the past and building a 
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 Decades after unification, the use of trials as vehicles for political expression is alive and 
well in modern-day Germany. After Chancellor Angela Merkel made headlines with her 
unprecedented acceptance of nearly a million migrants and refugees into German territory during 
the Syrian refugee crisis, German public backlash from far-right parties has produced a 
contentious political landscape.288 In the midst of this tension, the German government, which 
has remained liberal and democratic, used its legal system as a tool to express a new standard for 
the treatment of German citizens.  
 In 2013, 20 years after the conclusion of the Leipzig trial, the government orchestrated 
yet another historical trial, this time targeting an underground Neo-Nazi coalition. The trial, 
known colloquially as the National Socialist Underground (NSU) Trial, was conducted between 
2013 and 2018 by the Munich Higher Regional Court and aimed to address several crimes 
committed by the NSU terrorist group, most notably a series of murders targeting suspected 
immigrants and refugees.289 According to Philip Olterman of the Guardian, the trial was the 
longest and most expensive trial in German history.290  
 Like the 1992 Leipzig trial, the NSU Trial was designed to teach a political lesson in the 
midst of societal unrest. In a nation that has come to define itself by its treatment of the past, 
denouncing the Nazi party remains as necessary today as it was in 1945.291 Even though this 
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modern trial differs from the Leipzig trial in a number of regards, both trials were designed to 
send a message about the German state’s political evolution and treatment of historical crimes. 
On February 23rd, 2012, in the direct wake of the NSU murders, Chancellor Angela Merkel held 
an official state ceremony in commemoration of the victims.292 As part of the ceremony, which 
was broadcast across the country, Merkel called for the banning of the NSU and for a trial to 
bring them to justice. As Merkel expressed in her speech, this trial was designed to showcase the 
democratic nation’s intolerance of Neo-Nazi behavior and the German state’s tremendous 
political progress since the Second World War.293 Therefore, the NSU trial was orchestrated to 
both achieve justice for the victims of these hate crimes and to broadcast the nation’s political 
evolution. In this sense, the NSU trial functioned quite similarly to the 1992 trial. The 1992 
Leipzig trial set a precedent for the German state’s use of legal trials as arenas for the expression 
of political sentiments, and the NSU trial was a future manifestation of this legacy.  
 The 1992 Leipzig trial was a critique of the East German legal system, deliberately 
crafted to aid in the establishment and unification of the new state. As this thesis has shown, the 
Leipzig trial functioned both as a condemnation of the East and as an expression of the unified 
German state’s Western-leaning legal values. The expression of these values was intended to aid 
in the establishment and unification of the new state under shared principles of democratic 
governance and law.  
The politically divisive responses to the trial raise questions about whether the trial 
effectively united the German people. Yet, as the divisive responses illuminate, the trial did 
accomplish the goal of projecting a message about new legal standards in unified Germany. 
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Whether it functioned as a vehicle for victor’s justice or as an educational tool, the former East 
and West German communities agreed that the 1992 Leipzig trial was more than a traditional 
criminal trial. As a product of a hectic transitional period, the Leipzig trial conveyed political 
lessons about new legal norms in a time when these lessons were necessary elements of the state-
building process.294 
 As a trial of a trial, the proceedings at Leipzig could also be interpreted as an expression 
of the German state’s focus on the past and its treatment in the present. Although the available 
sources aren’t conclusive, it seems possible that this particular case was granted federal and 
public attention at the time because, in part, it could be used to convey political lessons about 
how the new state intended to grapple with the Holocaust. The treatment of Nazi crimes has 
remained a cornerstone of German national identity since the end of the Second World War, and 
as the NSU trial demonstrates, it is still a point of discussion in modern-day Germany.295  
 Whether the trial aimed to criticize the East German treatment of the Holocaust, its 
judicial practices, or both, the 1992 Leipzig trial set a precedent for future use of the German 
legal system as an arena for national introspection and legal critique. The law is an ever-
fluctuating construct that is shaped by the political system in which it is executed. Trials, such as 
those that occurred in unified Germany, thus offer an important window into the political 
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